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Two types of contractual solutions have been proposed for resolving incentive conﬂicts in vertical relationships: formaland relational (i.e., enforceable or not by third parties). Much is known about the optimal structure of formal contracts,
but relatively little is known about the structure of relational contracts. We study a core feature of the latter: the conditions
leading to continuation of the relationship, whose prospect gives relational contracts their force. We build a formal model
of a vertical relationship between two parties that endogenizes the choice of the minimum performance necessary for
continuation as a function of the values of contractibles, noncontractibles, and outside options. The model highlights a basic
trade-off between providing strong incentives for the present (incentive effect) and safeguarding relationships for the future
(termination effect). The stable relationships that follow from a more forgiving contract are more important under certain
conditions (when a lot of value is jointly created by exchange partners, i.e., high contractible value, high noncontractible
value, or unattractive outside options); however, strong incentives from a less forgiving contract are more important under
other conditions (when a formal contract is insufﬁcient and a relational contract is most important, i.e., high noncontractible
relative to contractible value). We discuss implications for the choice of governance of interorganizational relationships.
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1. Introduction
Vertical relationships are essential building blocks to
students of economic organization (Williamson 1975,
Grossman and Hart 1986, Poppo and Zenger 1998).
A fundamental concern is the incentive conﬂict that may
arise between parties across adjacent steps of the value
chain. Two different contractual solutions have been pro-
posed: formal and relational. A formal contract is an
agreement that is enforceable by third parties and under
which the threat of external punishment provides incen-
tives to cooperate (Williamson 1985). In contrast, a rela-
tional contract is not enforceable by outsiders because
they are unable to judge whether promises have been
fulﬁlled; instead, it is sustained by the value of the future
relationship (Macneil 1978, Axelrod 1984, Baker et al.
2002). The incentive to cooperate stems from the threat
of internal punishment—in particular, that one party will
sever the relationship if the other party underperforms.
Many studies have analyzed the structure of formal
contracts (e.g., Elfenbein and Lerner 2003, Corts and
Singh 2004, Mayer and Argyres 2004, Malhotra and
Lumineau 2011, Elfenbein and Lerner 2012). Although
relational contracts are no less frequent than formal ones
(Macaulay 1963), we know relatively little about their
structure.1 Several scholars consider the ongoing nature
of contracting relationships yet focus on prior rather
than future interactions (e.g., Argyres et al. 2007, Ryall
and Sampson 2009, Vanneste and Puranam 2010). Other
scholars do consider expected future interactions and
how these affect cooperation between exchange partners
(e.g., Heide and Miner 1992, Jap and Anderson 2003,
Carson et al. 2006, Poppo et al. 2008); in that literature,
however, the probability of future interactions is taken
to be exogenous. That approach contrasts with the one
taken here, in which the probability of the relationship
continuing is an endogenous consequence of the rela-
tional contract design.
If potential punishment gives a relational contract its
force, then one essential question about the structure of
any relational contract is, which conditions would jus-
tify punishment? More concretely, where is the threshold
that deﬁnes a party’s “underperformance”? This paper
examines where the optimal punishment “trigger” should
be set as a function of speciﬁc features of the con-
tracting environment. We draw on an extensive literature
pertaining to relational contracts (based on the theory
of repeated games), although most work in that ﬁeld
does not address optimal contract structure and focuses
instead on a different set of questions: existence and efﬁ-
ciency. The former is equivalent to asking, when will a
relational contract arise—that is, under what conditions
is it stable and enforceable (e.g., Green and Porter 1984,
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Rotemberg and Saloner 1986, Bull 1987, MacLeod and
Malcomson 1989)? The latter asks, how efﬁcient is a
relational contract relative to (or in the presence of) other
ways of governing a transaction (e.g., Baker et al. 1994,
2002; Bernheim and Whinston 1998; Rayo 2007)?
As determinants of the optimal punishment trigger, the
aspects of the environment that are central in contracting
theories of vertical relationships are our focus. A major
theme in this literature is that outsiders cannot objec-
tively verify all outcomes of the relationship, which cre-
ates the need for relational contracts (Williamson 1975,
Macneil 1978, Baker et al. 2002). Following this litera-
ture, we explore the role played in such contracts by the
value of so-called contractibles, noncontractibles, and
outside options (Williamson 1985, Grossman and Hart
1986). First, that some outcomes are non-veriﬁable does
not imply that all outcomes are, which means that for-
mal and relational contracts may coexist (Baker et al.
1994). Therefore, we examine the effect of contractible
value: that portion of value that can be speciﬁed in a
formal contract. Examples are delivery times, quantities,
and measurable product attributes (e.g., the clock speed
of a microprocessor or the dimensions of a machine
part). Second, given the non-veriﬁability of certain out-
comes, we also investigate the effect of noncontractible
value: that portion of value that cannot be speciﬁed in
a formal contract owing to inherent measurement dif-
ﬁculties. Examples include subjective quality (e.g., the
image resulting from an advertising campaign, the com-
mitment to share best practices, and continuous product
innovation). Third, because terminating a relationship is
relevant only when there are alternatives, we consider
the value of outside options. The value of such an option
is deﬁned as the value of the best alternative relative to
the value of the focal relationship. For instance, tech-
nological complementarity may allow a buyer to create
more value with one supplier than with another.
We develop a formal model that endogenizes the
choice of the punishment as a function of the values of
contractibles, noncontractibles, and outside options. In
this model, the trigger’s position is based on the min-
imum performance that must be met to avoid termina-
tion. Our model features two parties. One (Upstream)
produces a good whose value depends on both effort
and luck; the other (Downstream) decides, based on the
good’s value, whether or not to continue the relation-
ship. Because that value is but an imperfect measure of
Upstream’s effort, Downstream’s decision is subject to
error. Thus, it may happen that Downstream terminates
the relationship even though Upstream worked hard. In
the model, the optimal choice of performance thresh-
old hinges on the trade-off between an incentive effect
and a termination effect. On the one hand, a higher
performance threshold from Downstream incentivizes
Upstream to work harder (a positive effect); on the other
hand, a harsher punishment shortens the duration of
a potentially valuable relationship (a negative effect).
The optimal performance threshold balances these two
effects. We ﬁnd that this threshold is decreasing in both
contractible and noncontractible value (because these
increase the termination effect relative to the incentive
effect) and is increasing in the attractiveness of outside
options (because that decreases the termination effect
relative to the incentive effect). In short, we ﬁnd that
the more value is jointly created by exchange partners—
through greater contractible and/or noncontractible value
or through lesser outside option value—the lower the
performance threshold. An additional result is that for
constant total value, the greater the share of noncon-
tractible value relative to contractible value, the higher
the threshold. This is because that share decreases the
termination effect relative to the incentive effect. Thus,
when a formal contract cannot describe well the value
created in an exchange, the relational contract is most
important and will have a high performance threshold.
In an extension, we show that the model’s main propo-
sitions are qualitatively unchanged if we instead assume
that the performance threshold is exogenously ﬁxed and
that the decision variable is the probability of termi-
nation conditional on underperformance. In both cases,
the key element is what the relational contract indi-
cates about when to continue the relationship and, con-
sequently, whether it is structured as a more demanding
or a more forgiving contract.
Our main contribution is to show how this aspect of
a relational contract’s structure—that is, the extent of
its forgiveness—is optimally conditioned by the con-
tracting environment, including elements known to be
important in contracting theories of vertical relation-
ships (e.g., contractible value, noncontractible value,
outside options). We ﬁnd two consequences to increas-
ing the performance threshold: an incentive effect and
a termination effect. The relative importance of each
effect is altered by variations in these external factors,
which accounts for variations in the performance thresh-
old’s optimal level. Finally, to illustrate the model’s
applicability, in the Discussion section we describe
how our results can inform important questions regard-
ing the choice of governance of interorganizational
relationships.
2. Background
2.1. Theoretical Background
Relational contracts have different meanings across lit-
eratures. An economic interpretation, and the one fol-
lowed here, is that relational contracts are agreements
sustained by the value of the future relationship (Baker
et al. 2002). The basic idea is that a shared future
enables cooperation because parties can be rewarded or
punished tomorrow for things they do today (Axelrod
1984). Game theory has extensively developed this idea.
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A well-established result is that cooperation can be indi-
vidually optimal in a repeated game even if it is not opti-
mal in a one-shot version of the same game (Friedman
1971, Kreps et al. 1982, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986).
In a one-shot game, current actions do not inﬂuence
future payoffs. But a shared future—as arises in repeated
games—provides the opportunity to reward and pun-
ish good and bad behavior, respectively, which incen-
tivizes players to cooperate (Axelrod 1984). An effective
way of rewarding and punishing the actions of another
player is a trigger strategy (Axelrod 1984), whereby
a player will cooperate in the next round only if the
other player cooperates in the current round. Thus, a
player’s defection triggers a punishment. Given their
analytical tractability and intuitive appeal, trigger strate-
gies underlie much of the theoretical work on rela-
tional contracts (Radner 1981; Baker et al. 1994, 2002).
Consistent with theoretical predictions, empirical ﬁeld
studies ﬁnd that the expectation of future interactions
increases joint action (Heide and John 1990); ﬂexibil-
ity, information exchange, and problem solving (Heide
and Miner 1992); performance (Parkhe 1993); and bilat-
eral idiosyncratic investments (Jap and Anderson 2003).
Carson et al. (2006) ﬁnd no effect on opportunism. Thus,
a shadow of the future helps to align incentives between
exchange partners.
A more sociological interpretation of relational con-
tracts (and one that we do not follow here) refers to
the norms of cooperation that may emerge over time
between exchange partners (Granovetter 1985, Gulati
1995, Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995, Puranam and
Vanneste 2009). The crucial distinction is that these
works focus on the shadow of the past, not the future.
A shared history facilitates social interactions, which in
turn can lead to the establishment of cooperative norms
such as trust (Gulati 1995, Zaheer and Venkatraman
1995, Uzzi 1997). The shadow of the past and the
shadow of the future may lead to the same outcome
(e.g., cooperation), but they need not reinforce each
other. For example, it might be harder to establish trust
under expectations of future interactions because good
behavior may be attributed to external factors (strong
incentives) rather than internal factors (benevolence of
exchange partner; see Malhotra and Murnighan 2002).
Thus, the two “shadows” are conceptually distinct. For
this reason we restrict ourselves to relational contracts
supported by expected future interactions.
It is typically assumed that relational contracts cannot
be enforced by outsiders, and this is their key distinc-
tion from formal contracts. We do not refer to relational
contracts as “implicit” contracts because doing so might
create the false impression that relational contracts are
vague. In fact, they can be written down and, in gen-
eral, must be well understood to provide contracting par-
ties the appropriate incentives. Scholars often analyze
the design of a relational contract in terms of a ﬁxed
payment and, possibly, an additional bonus (e.g., Bull
1987; MacLeod and Malcomson 1989; Baker et al. 1994,
2002). In this paper we focus on another key element of
relational contracts: the performance threshold. To artic-
ulate this perspective clearly, our main model treats the
payment as ﬁxed so that we may restrict attention to the
conditions for continuation. We also report on an exten-
sion to this model in which we allow for a bonus; the
main results are unaffected.
Our approach is related to the models of Green and
Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) on col-
lusion and price wars in oligopolistic industries, which
analyze a punishment trigger in terms of a price thresh-
old. The market price dropping below that threshold
could signal that some companies have violated the col-
lusive agreement. Companies in the industry will retali-
ate by offering a lower price themselves (i.e., below the
optimal collusive price). Similarly, we analyze a punish-
ment trigger in terms of a performance threshold. Perfor-
mance below this level constitutes cause for terminating
the relationship. However, our model differs in several
important respects. First, as noted previously, Green and
Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) study
the question of existence—in other words, the condi-
tions under which a self-enforcing collusive agreement
is feasible among members of an industrial cartel (hor-
izontal relationships)—whereas we are concerned with
the optimal structure of a relational contract between
two parties in a bilateral vertical relationship and, in
particular, with the optimal performance threshold that
triggers punishment. Second, the results of Green and
Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) depend
in part on assumptions that are tailored to the context of
an industrial cartel, so their results may not carry over to
our context. Third, our key results concern the inﬂuence
of exogenous parameters—contractible/noncontractible
value and the value of the outside option—that do not
feature in the other models at all. Finally, our notion
of forgiveness is quite distinct from the one suggested
by the limited-duration price wars in the other models:
in our model, conditional on a single bad event, for-
giveness is either forever or not at all. Forgiveness is
embedded in the performance threshold, not in the dura-
tion of the punishment. Another related paper is Levin
(2003), which considers a performance threshold as a
punishment trigger in the context of bilateral relational
contracts. We extend Levin’s work by investigating the
optimal level of that performance threshold and how it
varies as a function of a set of exogenous factors.
2.2. Empirical Background
Forgiving is a frequent phenomenon in real-world sup-
plier relationships. Our theoretical analysis was orig-
inally inspired by extensive ﬁeld research conducted
at eight member companies of the Dutch Association
for Purchasing Management (NEVI). The companies
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are active in different industries, including chemicals,
telecommunications, basic materials, and transportation.
Annual company revenues exceed E1 billion. All com-
panies have international operations, although all of our
30 interview respondents (with job titles such as rela-
tionship manager, sourcing manager, and plant manager)
were based in the Netherlands. Interviews lasted on aver-
age 70 minutes, with a minimum of 50 and a maximum
of 100 minutes.
In our ﬁeldwork we regularly saw a systematized ver-
sion of forgiveness that had a natural connection to
our model. Customers have complex performance expec-
tations of their suppliers and use supplier rating sys-
tems to track performance and measure it on a unidi-
mensional scale. These ratings are based on systematic
checklists or questionnaires measuring multiple dimen-
sions of supplier performance. For example, in one com-
pany, employees rated the vendor on ﬁve dimensions
using questions including the following:
1. What is the defect rate in parts per million? (quality
dimension)
2. What is the conﬁrmed line item performance?
(a measure of order performance; delivery dimension)
3. How does supplier’s cost position compare to the
supply market? (cost dimension)
4. To what extent is the supplier ﬂexible to changes in
planning and ordering during the execution of deliveries
for production and in lead-time reduction? (responsive-
ness dimension)
5. To what extent does the supplier provide proac-
tively, and in a timely manner, technical road maps?
(innovation dimension)
Based on these responses, the vendor was given
a “trafﬁc light” rating of green (performing), yellow
(underperforming), or red (unacceptable). The rating,
which corresponds to the unveriﬁable performance mea-
sure in our model, is a weighted average of multiple
performance indicators that are largely unveriﬁable by
outsiders. The buyer maintains a website where a sup-
plier can log in to check its scores on the individual
items and its aggregate score. Note that the buyer’s goal
and expectation is a green level of performance from the
supplier (and the supplier has been made well aware of
this), but only a red rating results in supplier termination.
In another case, a similar system was in place, with A,
B, C, and D ratings based on the aggregation of seven
dimensions: safety, tidiness, quality, logistics, organiza-
tion, communication, and cooperativeness. Even though
these measures are not veriﬁable by outsiders, they are
included in the supplier agreements (to which we had
access). As Mayer and Argyres (2004) note, an unen-
forceable clause in a contract may still be useful to
align parties’ expectations and their actions. The buyer
shared each rating (individual items and aggregate score)
with the supplier. The buyer’s goal, and the expecta-
tion shared with the supplier, was an A, but only a D
was deemed unacceptable. In both cases from our ﬁeld-
work, that there is an intermediate zone of acceptable
performance that is nonetheless below expectations indi-
cates that forgiveness is built in to the supplier evaluation
system.
In general, forgiveness is the tolerance of low perfor-
mance. There are two speciﬁc ways of thinking about
forgiveness. First, it can be seen as the deviation from
desired performance that a party is willing to tolerate.
If the deviation is too great, i.e., performance too low,
the relationship is terminated. For instance, a professor
who allows students to come to class up to 20 minutes
late is more forgiving of lateness than a professor who
sets the limit at 5 minutes. In the prior examples, each
company has clear expectations about the desired per-
formance level but must also deﬁne the acceptable devi-
ation from that standard, i.e., choose the aggregate score
that deﬁnes the lowest category and results in termina-
tion (i.e., a red light or a D score). This is the decision
in our main model: a termination threshold, where a per-
formance below that threshold results in termination.
A second way of viewing forgiveness is how often
a party is willing to tolerate low performance, i.e., the
propensity to enforce a predeﬁned performance thresh-
old. For instance, the professor who sets the maximum
late arrival at ﬁve minutes but only enforces it in 50% of
cases is more forgiving than the professor who sets the
same threshold but enforces it in 100% of cases. In an
extension, this is the version of forgiveness we model:
a termination probability. There, performance can be
either low or high, and low performance leads to ter-
mination with some probability. The results are qualita-
tively similar across both speciﬁcations.
3. Formal Model
3.1. Speciﬁcation
Our model is based on Baker et al. (2002), which pro-
vides a useful foundation for thinking about vertical
relationships based on relational contracts. Baker and
colleagues address the relative efﬁciency of integration
versus nonintegration as deﬁned on the basis of asset
ownership. In contrast, we focus on the optimal degree
of forgiveness in relational contracts as indicated by
the performance threshold triggering termination. Hence
we do not use the asset ownership component of their
model. Although asset ownership is certainly relevant,
we treat it as a constant so as to articulate more clearly
our own perspective on vertical relationships: a relational
contract’s optimal degree of forgiveness.
We consider an Upstream and a Downstream party
who can choose to trade with each other; both are
risk neutral. In each period, Upstream produces a good
by choosing a level of effort e ∈ 0→ at cost ce.
Upstream’s cost is increasing in effort ce/e > 0
at an increasing rate (2ce/e2 > 0). Upstream’s
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effort generates a stochastic value of the good, Q,
for Downstream, where this value is continuous and
QL ≤Q<QH . Let Q ≡ QH − QL > 0; then we can
deﬁne Q ≡ QL + qeQ, where qe is a stochastic
function within 01. Effort increases qe in a ﬁrst-
order stochastic dominance sense so that, on average,
more effort leads to higher value.2 If Upstream exerts
no effort, then we assume that the value of the good is
minimum (Q=QL when q0= 0) and that the cost is
zero (c0= 0).
We further assume that effort is observable only to
Upstream and that no outsiders can verify the value of
the good. It is therefore impossible to write an enforce-
able, formal contract on the input or output of the pro-
duction process. Hence Q captures all the elements that
are noncontractible (owing to non-observability of effort
or to non-veriﬁability of quality), and QL includes any-
thing that can be addressed in a formal contract. Thus,
Q denotes noncontractible value and QL contractible
value; their sum, QH , is total value.
3
Downstream compensates Upstream through a combi-
nation of a ﬁxed fee before production (w > 0)4 and the
prospect of future business. Given our theoretical inter-
ests, the focus in this paper is on the latter. If the parties
cannot agree on a compensation scheme, then they do
not trade with each other and instead receive their out-
side option. We focus on those instances where the out-
side opportunities are less desirable than efﬁcient trade
yet more attractive than when Upstream has no incentive
to perform (see Levin 2003).5
In a one-time interaction, the up-front fee does not
provide Upstream any performance incentive and leaves
Downstream to bear the risk of moral hazard (i.e.,
Upstream providing insufﬁcient or no effort). In this
static game, Upstream and Downstream will not trade
with each other given their outside opportunities. The
prospect of repeated interactions, however, can incen-
tivize Upstream and Downstream to trade—even when
agreements are not enforceable. For Upstream, the cost
of cheating (giving too little effort) now includes the
possible lost value of the future relationship. So in the
repeated game, Upstream and Downstream will trade
with each other under certain conditions that we shall
specify.
In the repeated game, Downstream faces an infer-
ence problem: If the value of the good is poor, did
Upstream shirk, or was Upstream unlucky despite work-
ing hard? To provide incentives, in the ﬁrst case Down-
stream would want to punish Upstream and terminate
the relationship; in the second case, Downstream would
want to reward Upstream and continue the relationship.
Because effort is unobservable, Downstream cannot dis-
tinguish between these two cases. Hence Downstream
speciﬁes a minimum value: if realized value exceeds
this level for a given period, then Downstream contin-
ues the relationship; otherwise, Downstream terminates
the relationship. In short, one party (Upstream) expends
effort and then the other party (Downstream) decides
whether that effort’s outcome is sufﬁcient to continue
the relationship.
We can express this minimum value as QL + pQ,
where p ∈ 01 indicates the minimum proportion of
noncontractible value that must be exceeded. We study
the optimal threshold p∗, which provides a scale-free
indicator of the relational contract. If the minimum
threshold is not realized, then Downstream keeps the
good and terminates the relationship, whereafter the par-
ties receive their outside payments forever after. As in
Klein et al. (1978) and Baker et al. (2002), we assume
that Downstream can commit in advance not to rene-
gotiate the contract in the event of underperformance—
that is, its ﬁring threat is credible. This assumption is
motivated by the realization that if Downstream fails to
carry through on its threats, then Upstream is unlikely to
believe those threats in the future under a renegotiated
contract (see also similar arguments in Fudenberg and
Tirole 1991 and Rabin 1991). Hollow threats will not
induce Upstream to exert effort. As a result, the rela-
tionship would be less valuable than the parties’ outside
options.67
Let UO denote Upstream’s net present value of not
entering the relationship (i.e., the value of the outside
option), and let UR denote Upstream’s net present value
of entering the relationship. The continuation probability
is  ≡ Pqe > p	, and we use a common discount
factor 
 ∈ 01:
UR ≡w− ce+ 1−
UO +
UR (1)
Likewise, let DO denote Downstream’s net present value
of not entering the relationship, let DR denote Down-
stream’s net present value of entering the relationship,
and deﬁne Eqe  e	= q¯e:
DR ≡QL+ q¯eQ−w+ 1−
DO +
DR (2)
Then Upstream and Downstream will enter into the rela-
tionship if and only if their payoffs are higher than their
outside options:
UR >UO and DR >DO (3)
These boundary conditions imply that the wage must
satisfy8
ce+1−
UO<w<QL+ q¯eQ+
−1DO (4)
In the next section, we ﬁrst explore the optimal effort
level e∗ for Upstream and then Downstream’s optimal
performance threshold, which is expressed as a propor-
tion p∗ of noncontractible value.
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3.2. Results
Upstream will choose optimal effort (e∗) to maximize its
payoffs:
max
e
URep (5)
This gives the following ﬁrst-order condition for the
optimal effort level:
UR
e
= 
e

UR−UO− ce
e
+
U
R
e
= 0 (6)
so that

e

UR−UO= ce
e
at e= e∗ (7)
The left-hand side of this expression represents the
marginal beneﬁt of effort, and the right-hand side repre-
sents the marginal cost of effort. Upstream will choose
effort such that the marginal beneﬁt equals the marginal
cost.
Downstream will choose the optimal threshold—
expressed as a proportion p∗ of noncontractible value—
to maximize its payoffs:
max
p
DRe∗ p (8)
This leads to the following ﬁrst-order condition for the
optimal threat level:
dDR
dp
= dq¯e
∗
dp
Q+ d
dp

DR−DO+
dD
R
dp
= 0
(9)
so that
dq¯e∗
dp
Q=−d
dp

DR−DO at p= p∗ (10)
The ﬁrst term represents the marginal beneﬁt of the
threshold, and the second term represents its marginal
cost. Hence, an increase in the threshold has two oppos-
ing effects on the relationship value for Downstream:
an incentive effect dq¯e∗/dpQ and a termination
effect d/dp
DR−DO. In the appendix we show
that the incentive effect is positive. It represents the
increase in expected value resulting from greater effort.
In equilibrium, if Downstream sets a higher threshold,
then Upstream works harder, making it more likely that
the good is of higher value. Thus the incentive effect
is the marginal beneﬁt of the performance threshold.
The termination effect is the effect of an increase in the
threshold on the probability of continuation. In equilib-
rium, an increase in the threshold makes it more likely
that the relationship is terminated; hence a higher thresh-
old reduces the expected duration of the relationship.
If a higher threshold did not lead to more termination,
then Downstream would increase the threshold because
doing so would lead to more effort and would better
safeguard the relationship. Because the outside option is
less valuable (see Equation (3)), the termination effect
is negative. Thus, the termination effect is the marginal
cost of the performance threshold.
See the appendix for additional details and for the
formal proofs of the propositions that follow. Our ﬁrst
proposition concerns Upstream’s optimal effort.
Proposition 1. Optimal effort is increasing in the
threshold at p= p∗ e∗/p > 0.
The intuition behind this statement is as follows. In
equilibrium, an increase in the threshold increases the
marginal beneﬁt of effort but does not affect its marginal
cost. An increase in marginal beneﬁt implies that effort
is more critical for meeting the higher threshold (i.e.,
luck alone is less likely to be sufﬁcient). It follows that
optimal effort must increase. In other words, in equi-
librium, the more likely the punishment, the less attrac-
tive the expected payoffs from exerting low effort. To
avoid this outcome, Upstream exerts more effort; hence,
its optimal effort increases with a stronger threat of
termination.
We now turn to the propositions for Downstream’s
optimal performance threshold. The optimal threshold is
where the marginal beneﬁt of the threshold equals its
marginal cost or, equivalently, where the incentive effect
equals the termination effect. Because of the termina-
tion effect, it is not always optimal to set a high thresh-
old. The model points to a trade-off between providing
strong incentives for immediate gains and maintaining
the relationship for the future; one cannot have both.
We analyze this trade-off by examining how the opti-
mal performance threshold is affected by contractible
value (QL), noncontractible value (Q), and the value
of Downstream’s outside option (DO). To discover how
the optimal threshold changes, we study how these
exogenous variables affect the incentive and termination
effects (i.e., the marginal beneﬁt MB and cost MC). If
the marginal beneﬁt increases more (or decreases less)
than the marginal cost, then the threshold will increase.
Table 1 presents an overview of the results.
Proposition 2 addresses changes in contractible value
while holding noncontractible value constant; con-
versely, Proposition 3 addresses changes in noncon-
tractible value while holding contractible value constant.
In both of these propositions, total value is allowed to
change because it equals the sum of contractible and
noncontractible value. In Proposition 4, we hold total
value constant and consider changes in noncontractible
value, which implies offsetting changes in contractible
value. Hence, this proposition concerns the share of non-
contractible relative to contractible value.
Proposition 2. For constant noncontractible value,
the optimal performance threshold is decreasing in con-
tractible value p∗/QLQ < 0.
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Table 1 Overview of Model Propositions
Incentive Termination Performance
Description effect MB effect MC threshold p∗
Proposition 2: More contractible value, constant
noncontractible value p∗/QLQ
Constant Increases Decreases
Proposition 3: More noncontractible value, constant
contractible value p∗/QQL 
Increases Increases more Decreases
Proposition 4: More noncontractible value, constant
total value p∗/QQH 
Increases Decreases Increases
The intuition for this result is as follows. An increase
in contractible value increases the net present value
of the relationship, making it more costly to termi-
nate. Therefore, the termination effect is increasing
in contractible value. The level of contractible value
does not affect the incentive effect because contractible
value does not depend on noncontractible effort; hence
the incentive effect is constant and the termination
effect increases. The marginal beneﬁt is constant and
the marginal cost increases, so the optimal threshold
decreases.
The termination effect is negative because the rela-
tionship is more valuable relative to the outside option.
Just as an increase in contractible value magniﬁes the
termination effect, so does a decrease in the value of
the outside option. Because a change in the outside
option does not affect the incentive effect, the opti-
mal threshold is increasing in the value of the outside
option p∗/DO > 0. In other words, for the optimal
threshold, increasing contractible value is equivalent to
decreasing the value of the outside option.
Proposition 3. For constant contractible value, the
optimal performance threshold is decreasing in noncon-
tractible value p∗/QQL < 0.
An increase in noncontractible value increases the
incentive effect because the former means that effort
leads to higher expected payoffs in the current round.
The termination effect also increases since the relation-
ship becomes more valuable and hence termination more
costly.
Which effect dominates? Let us compare two cases
with equal amounts of noncontractible value but differ-
ent amounts of total value. In case 1, noncontractible
value accounts for a negligible share of total value; in
case 2, noncontractible value accounts for almost the
entire share of total value. An increase in noncontractible
value leads to similar increases in the incentive effect
in both cases. In case 1, however, the termination effect
will hardly change relative to the change in the incen-
tive effect because only a small part of the total value
of the relationship is affected. The situation is reversed
in case 2: relative to the change in incentive effect, the
change in the termination effect will be much larger
because a much larger part of the total value of the rela-
tionship is affected.
Given our focus on the shadow of the future, we are
most interested in what the model tells us about rela-
tionships for which noncontractible value is important.
As mentioned previously, we focus on instances where
the outside opportunities are less attractive than efﬁcient
trade but more attractive than when Upstream has no
incentive to perform. (In other words, absent noncon-
tractible value, the parties would not enter the relation-
ship because their outside options would be preferable.)
We show in the appendix that for such relationships,
changes in noncontractible value inﬂuence the termi-
nation effect more than the incentive effect. Hence an
increase in noncontractible value raises the marginal cost
more than the marginal beneﬁt, so the optimal threshold
will decrease.
Proposition 4. For constant total value, the optimal
performance threshold is increasing in noncontractible
value p∗/QQH > 0.
Recall that Propositions 3 and 4 both relate to changes
in noncontractible value but differ in what is held con-
stant. In Proposition 3, contractible value is held con-
stant so that a change in noncontractible value leads to
a change in total value; in Proposition 4, total value is
held constant so that an increase in noncontractible value
leads to a decrease in contractible value. Thus Proposi-
tion 4 concerns the share of noncontractible value versus
contractible value (for constant total value).
With an increase in noncontractible value, the incen-
tive effect increases: the higher effort resulting from a
higher performance threshold leads to more expected
gains in the current round. In contrast, the termination
effect decreases under these circumstances. Given con-
stant total value, an increase in noncontractible value
implies a decrease in contractible value. Therefore, the
value of the best outcome per round remains constant
while the value of the worst outcome decreases; hence
the expected value of the relationship decreases. It thus
becomes less costly to terminate the relationship. The
marginal cost goes down and the marginal beneﬁt goes
up, so the optimal threshold will increase.
3.3. Alternative Speciﬁcations of the Model
We consider three alternative speciﬁcations of the model
to assess the robustness of its results: an optimal thresh-
old that maximizes total surplus (instead of the one that
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maximizes Downstream’s value), a bonus that is con-
tingent on the value of the good (in addition to, or in
lieu of, a ﬁxed wage), and a stochastic decision rule for
terminating the relationship (rather than a deterministic
rule).
3.3.1. Total Surplus. The model described so far
assumes that Downstream sets the optimal performance
threshold to maximize its payoffs (DR). An alternative
is to ﬁnd the threshold that maximizes the joint payoffs
for Upstream and Downstream. We deﬁne total surplus
(SR) as
SR ≡UR+DR (11)
Now the optimal performance threshold p∗ is such that9
max
p
SRe∗ p (12)
In the online appendix (available as supplemen-
tal material at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2013.0861),
we derive the ﬁrst-order condition. We ﬁnd that the
optimal threshold for maximizing only Downstream’s
value is higher than the one for maximizing total sur-
plus. The reason is that when maximizing total surplus,
the incentive effect is lower (because it also reﬂects the
costs that Upstream incurs when exerting more effort)
and the termination effect is higher (because it accounts
for the value lost not only by Downstream but also by
Upstream). Hence the marginal beneﬁt of the thresh-
old decreases and the marginal cost increases. As a
result, the threshold that maximizes Downstream’s value
is higher than the threshold that maximizes total surplus.
Although the levels of the marginal beneﬁt and cost
change under the total surplus criterion, qualitatively, the
analysis remains much the same. Indeed, it can be shown
that the propositions addressing the optimal threshold
(i.e., Propositions 2–4) hold when maximizing total sur-
plus. In particular, the optimal performance threshold
decreases if contractible value increases (Proposition 2)
and decreases if noncontractible value increases (Propo-
sition 3). Similarly, the share of noncontractible ver-
sus contractible value (Proposition 4) affects the optimal
threshold in the same way regardless of which maxi-
mization criterion is applied.
3.3.2. Bonus. In the model, Upstream receives a
wage that is independent of the good’s value. We con-
sider here a model in which, in addition to a wage,
Downstream pays Upstream a bonus b if and only if
the good’s value is above the critical threshold.10 In
the online appendix, we provide Upstream’s and Down-
stream’s ﬁrst-order conditions for this extension. The
marginal beneﬁt for Upstream’s effort now includes
the additional expected bonus it will receive, while its
marginal cost of effort stays the same. The marginal
cost for Downstream’s threshold now takes into account
the additional expected bonus it will pay in the cur-
rent round. Its marginal beneﬁt remains the same.
Once again, the analysis is qualitatively unaffected even
though the level of the marginal cost differs depending
on whether a bonus is present. We can therefore use
similar logic as before to show that all the propositions
derived for a model without a bonus hold also for a
model with a bonus.
3.3.3. Stochastic Termination. The base model as-
sumes that value is stochastic and continuous and the
decision rule to terminate is deterministic—that is, ter-
minate if performance is (at or) below the threshold
but continue if it is above the threshold. An alterna-
tive is to assume that value is stochastic and discrete
(i.e., QH with probability qe and QL with probability
1− qe) and the decision rule to terminate is stochas-
tic: if the value is QL, then Downstream terminates with
probability < 1; if the value is QH , then Downstream
continues with probability = 1. This scenario can be
interpreted as Downstream playing a mixed strategy. In
the online appendix, we show that the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions are almost identical to the ﬁrst-order conditions for
our basic model. Hence, we can use the logic from our
basic model to re-derive all four of our propositions.
In sum, Propositions 1–4 hold across a number of
different speciﬁcations, which suggests that our model
captures a robust phenomenon. In the next section, we
discuss the logic that uniﬁes the different speciﬁcations.
3.4. The Incentive and Termination Effects
Our model highlights a trade-off between two oppos-
ing effects. The ﬁrst is the incentive effect: a higher
performance threshold incentivizes Upstream to exert
more effort. If high performance is not required for the
continuation of a relationship, then there is little incen-
tive to work hard. But if future business is awarded on
the basis of past outcomes, then Upstream has a strong
motivation to perform. In such cases, future outcomes
affect current actions. Opposed to this incentive effect
is the termination effect: a higher performance threshold
makes it more likely that a valuable relationship will be
terminated. Punishing underperformance more harshly
decreases the duration of the relationship, which offsets
the incentive effect. The termination effect of a higher
performance threshold is negative whenever the focal
relationship is more valuable than the outside option.
The existence of a termination effect implies that a more
demanding or less forgiving relational contract (i.e., one
with a higher performance threshold) is not necessarily
better. Rather, the optimal performance threshold reﬂects
a trade-off between providing strong incentives for the
present and maintaining the relationship for the future.
Our model predicts differences in the optimal perfor-
mance threshold depending on the amount of value from
contractible versus noncontractible sources. By deﬁni-
tion, contractible value can be captured in a formal con-
tract. Noncontractible value cannot, and it is precisely in
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such cases that the promise of future business serves as
an incentive. Our model predicts that the optimal perfor-
mance threshold is decreasing in both contractible and
noncontractible value (when either increases the total
value of the relationship) but is increasing in noncon-
tractible value when total value is held constant (i.e.,
when the share of noncontractible value relative to con-
tractible value increases). So even when value can be
speciﬁed in a formal agreement, it inﬂuences the rela-
tional agreement between two parties (see also Baker
et al. 1994, Bernheim and Whinston 1998).
The intuition for these results can be found by
examining how contractible and noncontractible value
affect each of the incentive and termination effects. If
the incentive effect increases relative to the termina-
tion effect, then the optimal performance threshold also
increases. If the incentive effect decreases relative to the
termination effect, then the optimal performance thresh-
old falls. More contractible value by itself makes the
relationship more valuable and thereby increases the ter-
mination cost. Yet more contractible value does not yield
stronger incentives to produce noncontractible value, so
the optimal performance threshold decreases with con-
tractible value. By itself, more noncontractible value
increases both the incentive and termination effects;
incentives from threatening have more impact, and the
relationship becomes more costly to terminate. When
noncontractible value constitutes a large part of the rela-
tionship’s value—when the shadow of the future is most
relevant—the termination effect will dominate the incen-
tive effect. In other words, when a relational contract
is most important (i.e., when a formal contract can-
not describe well the value created in an exchange),
the relational contract will be a demanding one (i.e.,
unforgiving).
Figure 1 illustrates these general results for the opti-
mal performance threshold p∗ via arbitrary speciﬁc func-
tional forms that conform to the general requirements
for qe and ce: qe = 1 − 1/1+ x · 5e, where x
is a random variable uniformly distributed in 01;
ce = 12e2; w = 045; UO = 4; DO = 4; and 
 = 095.
The ﬁgure shows that the optimal performance threshold
is decreasing in noncontractible value (on the horizon-
tal axis) and also in contractible value (on the vertical
axis). For high values of either type, the optimal per-
formance threshold is lower (p∗ < 005); for low values,
that threshold is higher (p∗ > 035).
Figure 1 also shows how the optimal performance
threshold varies in response to changes in the share of
noncontractible relative to contractible value. Along the
thick diagonal line that intersects the vertical axis at
QL = 040 and the horizontal axis at Q = 190, total
value is constant (QH = 190), but the share of non-
contractible value increases from the vertical axis inter-
section to the horizontal axis intersection. Increasing
Figure 1 Optimal Performance Threshold p∗ as a Function
of Contractible Value QL and Noncontractible
Value Q
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the share of noncontractible value ampliﬁes the incen-
tive effect because it increases the gains from effort in
the current round; however, it weakens the termination
effect because the relationship becomes less valuable (in
a given round, the best outcome is constant but the worst
outcome worsens). Thus, more noncontractible value rel-
ative to contractible value leads to a higher performance
threshold.
3.4.1. Effect of Wage on Optimal Threshold. We
provide here an additional analysis of the effect of the
wage, a key incentive mechanism, on the optimal thresh-
old (p∗/w). We illustrate that (1) the sign of this
derivative is indeterminate, and (2) regardless of the
sign, our propositions hold. We use the same speciﬁca-
tion as before: qe = 1− 1/1+ x · 5e, where x is a
random variable uniformly distributed in 01; ce=
1
2e
2; UO = 4; DO = 4; and 
 = 095 (see the online
appendix for formal proofs and generic functions). Fig-
ure 2 shows four scenarios with differing levels of con-
tractible and noncontractible value (I: QL = 00, Q =
15; II: QL = 00, Q = 19; III: QL = 04, Q = 15;
and IV: QL = 04, Q = 19). This set of contractible
and noncontractible values is such that the contractible
value is not sufﬁcient for the parties to enter into a rela-
tionship (but the sum of contractible and noncontractible
values makes the relationship worth more than the out-
side options). For each scenario we analyze the entire
wage range by increasing the wage in increments of 001
from the minimum to the maximum allowed value. The
range of permissible wages varies across the scenarios
because the value of the relationship differs.
For the same production and cost functions, we
observe all possible relationships between the wage and
the optimal threshold. For the two upper plots, the opti-
mal threshold increases with wage. For the two lower
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Figure 2 The Relationship Between Wage and the Optimal
Threshold Can Be Positive, Zero, or Negative
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left plots, the optimal threshold initially decreases with
wage, then is constant, and eventually increases. Thus,
as suggested by the formal approach (see the online
appendix), the relationship between wage and the opti-
mal threshold is not unidirectional.
Regardless of the direction of the wage–threshold rela-
tionship, however, our main propositions hold. Propo-
sition 2 states that the optimal threshold decreases in
contractible value for constant noncontractible value.
Proposition 3 indicates that the optimal threshold
decreases in noncontractible value for constant con-
tractible value. Proposition 4 says that the optimal
threshold increases in the share of noncontractible value
for constant total value. Taken together, this implies
the following for the optimal threshold for the different
scenarios:
• p∗I > p
∗
III because the level of contractible value is
greater in scenario III and the level of noncontractible
value is the same (Proposition 2).
• p∗I > p
∗
II because the level of noncontractible value
is greater in scenario II and the level of contractible
value is the same (Proposition 3).
• p∗II > p
∗
III because the share of noncontractible
value is greater in scenario II and the level of total value
is the same (Proposition 4).
• p∗III > p
∗
IV because the level of noncontractible
value is greater in scenario IV and the level of con-
tractible value is the same (Proposition 3).
Figure 3 illustrates these propositions. It shows the
optimal threshold for the different scenarios for the
wages that are permissible in all scenarios. In other
words, Figure 3 shows a subset of the data of Figure 2.
For the same wage, we see that our propositions hold
such that p∗I > p
∗
II > p
∗
III > p
∗
IV . Scenario I () is above
scenario II (+), is above scenario III (×), and is above
scenario IV (	).
In Figure 3 some wages create more value than oth-
ers. An optimal wage is such that no other wage from
the range of permissible wages creates more value in
the relationship. The propositions are derived for any
arbitrary wage that causes both parties to enter the rela-
tionship voluntarily. Thus, regardless of the value of the
wage (provided that the boundary conditions are met;
Figure 3 The Propositions Hold Independent of the
Relationship Between Wage and Optimal Threshold
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see (4)) or the wage’s relationship with the optimal
threshold, the propositions hold.
4. Discussion
The key decision variable in our model is the perfor-
mance threshold speciﬁed by the relational contract, a
value (at or) below which the relationship is terminated.
This decision variable can be thought of as establish-
ing either a more forgiving contract (lower threshold or
termination probability) or a less forgiving one (higher
threshold or termination probability). In this section, we
relate our ﬁndings to management theory and practice.
First, we highlight that forgiving is important, beneﬁcial,
and frequent.
Forgiving is important when a vertical relation-
ship (partly) depends on a relational contract, which
Macaulay (1963) suggests is often the case. By deﬁni-
tion, a relational contract is unenforceable by outsiders.
Instead, the incentive to cooperate comes from the threat
of internal punishment—in particular, the breaking of
the relationship if the other underperforms. Therefore,
a fundamental question about the structure of any rela-
tional contract is, what conditions justify punishment?
Or conversely, what conditions justify forgiveness?
Forgiving is beneﬁcial when actions relate imperfectly
to outcomes. In groundbreaking work, Axelrod (1984)
discovered that in repeated prisoner’s dilemmas, a sim-
ple tit-for-tat strategy—start with cooperation and then
do whatever the other player does—was most successful.
Soon, however, it became clear that this ﬁnding did not
generalize to settings with noise (equivalent to “luck” in
our model setup), i.e., where an outcome is an imperfect
indicator of what the other did. An unintended defect
outcome would trigger retaliation in a tit-for-tat strat-
egy. A more forgiving strategy, i.e., one that does not
immediately play defect after the other defects, outper-
forms tit-for-tat in a noisy environment (Bendor et al.
1991, Nowak and Sigmund 1992, Kollock 1993). Thus
forgiveness implies a tolerance for bad outcomes. To the
extent that in vertical relationships actions imperfectly
relate to outcomes, forgiveness is beneﬁcial. Finally, for-
giving is a frequent phenomenon in real-world supplier
relationships, as also observed in our ﬁeldwork.
Given the importance of forgiveness, how might
researchers test our theory and managers apply it? We
offer one direction here: if (1) governance structures dif-
fer in terms of their levels of forgiveness and if (2) rela-
tionship value-added and share of noncontractible value
inﬂuence the optimal level of forgiveness, then (3) rela-
tionship value-added and the share of noncontractible
value will affect governance structures, all else being
equal. We discuss these points in turn.
On the ﬁrst point regarding the decision variable,
we conjecture the degree of forgiveness to depend on
the nature of the relationship. Supplier relationships
come in many shades, including—in increasing intensity
of collaboration—arm’s-length relationships, nonequity
alliances, equity alliances, and joint ventures (Yoshino
and Rangan 1995). We speculate that higher degrees
of collaboration between a buyer and supplier will be
associated with higher levels of forgiveness. More gen-
erally, the organization of vertical relationships can be
described on a continuum with markets and ﬁrms as end-
points (Stinchcombe 1985, Powell 1987, Hennart 1993).
Firms tend to be more forgiving than markets in the
sense that ﬁrms have a higher tolerance of bad outcomes
before relationships are terminated (Williamson 1985,
Powell 1987, Eccles and White 1988). We anticipate
that this association holds not just for the endpoints of
the continuum but also for intermediate forms, so that
more ﬁrm-like external relationships are more forgiving
than more market-like external relationships. For exam-
ple, a nonequity alliance would be more forgiving than
an arm’s-length relationship but less so than an equity
alliance.
On the second point, regarding the main exoge-
nous parameters in our model—total value, contractible
value, and noncontractible value—we see two possible
approaches.11 One is to look for direct empirical equiv-
alents of these constructs. The other, which is possi-
bly easier for measurement, is to think in comparative
terms. Here, we discuss how this might be accomplished
through a simple transformation of our parameters that
preserves all of the model’s key propositions.
Speciﬁcally, we can deﬁne the share of noncon-
tractible value as the fraction of value created in the
relationship that comes from noncontractible sources, or
Q/QH . And we can deﬁne relationship value-added
as the ratio QH/d
O , where dO represents the per-period
value of the outside option. The optimal threshold is
increasing in the share of noncontractible value (from
Proposition 4) and decreasing in relationship value-
added (based on Propositions 2 and 3, and as we further
illustrate in the online appendix). The share of noncon-
tractible value might be associated, for example, with
the nature of the product. If it is a service, it might
be difﬁcult for third parties to verify outcomes of the
relationship because they are mainly intangible (Levitt
1981). If the product is a tangible, physical good, veriﬁ-
cation by a third party becomes easier so that the share
of noncontractible value is lower.12 Relationship value-
added is closely associated with Dyer and Singh’s (1998)
“relational rents.”
Combining the ﬁrst point (on forgiveness and gover-
nance structures) and the second point (on relationship
value-added/share of noncontractible value and forgive-
ness) then suggests that a high share of noncontractible
value is associated with less forgiving governance struc-
tures (e.g., arm’s-length relationship) and high relation-
ship value-added with more forgiving governance struc-
tures (e.g., equity alliances), all else being equal. When
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the share of noncontractible value is high and relationship
value-added low (or vice versa), a governance structure
with a more intermediate level of forgiveness might be
preferred (e.g., nonequity alliance).
We highlight the following contributions. Our main
contribution is to analyze how a critical aspect of any
relational contract—the extent of its forgiveness—is
inﬂuenced by the contracting environment. Existing lit-
erature has paid more attention to the structure of formal
than relational contracts, despite the latter being ubiq-
uitous (Macaulay 1963). Based on the model, we ﬁnd
that less forgiveness—through a more demanding per-
formance threshold—has two consequences: an incen-
tive effect (so that the other party works harder) and
an opposing termination effect (so that it is more likely
that the relationship will be terminated). We ﬁnd that the
optimal performance threshold is decreasing in both con-
tractible and noncontractible value and is increasing in
the share of noncontractible value relative to contractible
value and value of the outside options.
A second contribution is to the literature on vertical
relationships. These relationships come in many grada-
tions and are usefully thought of as lying on a continuum
with markets and ﬁrms as endpoints (Stinchcombe 1985,
Powell 1987, Hennart 1993). Because most relationships
are of an intermediate form (Powell 1987, Hennart 1993,
Zenger and Hesterly 1997), one cost of focusing on pure
forms is a deﬁcient understanding of the many orga-
nizational arrangements that are not pure (Stinchcombe
1985). Collectively, this research suggests that we should
view governance forms as being distributed on a contin-
uum or, at the very least, that we consider the discrete
forms observed in practice to be correlated with some
underlying, continuous latent variable. Our treatment
of a continuous governance mechanism—the extent of
forgiveness—offers a natural way, going forward, to the-
orize about this latent variable and the many relationships
occupying the interior of the continuum, which include
arm’s-length relationships, nonequity alliances, equity
alliances, and joint ventures (Yoshino and Rangan 1995).
Prior literature on vertical relationships has high-
lighted the importance of expected future interactions
on cooperation, also known as the shadow of the future
(e.g., Heide and Miner 1992, Jap and Anderson 2003,
Carson et al. 2006, Poppo et al. 2008). We add to
this literature by highlighting an important trade-off
in how the shadow of the future shapes incentives
in vertical relationships. When future interactions are
expected with certainty (i.e., when forgiveness for under-
performance is automatic), they provide no incentive.
However, too-strict termination conditions (i.e., no for-
giveness at all) may result in the loss of a valuable rela-
tionship. The optimal contract must balance these con-
ﬂicting concerns.
We note the following limitations. As for any model,
we faced a decision about what to include and what to
exclude. We have chosen to present a fairly parsimo-
nious model. Although this aids clarity and enables us
to identify the key mechanisms, it also means that cer-
tain empirical phenomena are not readily represented in
our model. For example, we focus on one-sided produc-
tion (i.e., the upstream party produces), whereas some
relationships may involve joint production. Relatedly, we
focus on the moral hazard of the upstream party (e.g.,
effort level). In practice, there might also be the potential
that Downstream fails to live up to its obligation, such
that moral hazard is double-sided. Finally, the model
considers each supply relationship in isolation, though
spillovers may exist between relationships (Argyres and
Liebskind 1999, Frank 2013). We see these as useful
extensions for future research.
We suggest several further avenues for future research.
The ﬁrst avenue is direct empirical testing of the model’s
implications as discussed above. Second, our model can
be extended to horizontal relationships. Those that rely
on one-sided production are easily represented in the
current model. Relationships involving two-sided pro-
duction would require that the model be reﬁned. Third,
we argue that the degree of forgiveness is an important
governance mechanism in vertical relationships between
ﬁrms. An important question is how different gov-
ernance modes—arm’s-length relationships, nonequity
alliances, equity alliances, and joint ventures—affect
forgiveness. As discussed earlier, we suspect that the
degree of forgiveness is higher in joint ventures than
in alliances and higher in alliances than in arm’s-length
relationships. Future research needs to establish whether
this is indeed the case, and if so, why. Fourth, we
have focused on vertical relationships between ﬁrms, but
such relationships also occur within ﬁrms. Relationships
within ﬁrms tend to be more forgiving than relationships
between ﬁrms in the sense that within ﬁrms there is a
higher tolerance for bad outcomes before relationships
are terminated (Williamson 1985, Powell 1987, Eccles
and White 1988). Future research can establish to what
extent our predictions about between-ﬁrm relationships
hold for predictions about within- versus between-ﬁrm
relationships.
5. Conclusion
Our theory formalizes the notion of forgiveness in the
context of a relational buyer–supplier contract and high-
lights the double-edged nature of forgiveness in these
contracts. More forgiveness is valuable because it leads
to more stable relationships that are less likely to be ter-
minated because of accidental underperformance. How-
ever, more forgiveness also dampens the supplier’s effort
incentives, since a less demanding performance thresh-
old is more easily met. Our ﬁeldwork and discussion
indicate two ways that different degrees of forgiveness
might be implemented in practice. One is by choosing
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a more or less stringent performance threshold, such as
in the supplier evaluation systems that we observe in
our ﬁeldwork. The other is by choosing the degree of
buyer–supplier integration. In the discussion, we conjec-
ture that a more arm’s-length relationship is inherently
a less forgiving one, whereas a relationship that more
closely resembles vertical integration is inherently more
forgiving. Our theory therefore has implications not only
for contract design but also for the design of interorga-
nizational relationships. We believe that further analyses
through the lens of forgiveness could yield important
insights into such relationships.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material to this paper is available at http://dx.doi
.org/10.1287/orsc.2013.0861.
Acknowledgments
The authors appreciate the helpful comments of Afonso
Almeida Costa, Sendil Ethiraj, Isabel Fernandez-Mateo, Gerry
George, Javier Gimeno, Sameer Hasija, Toby Kretschmer,
Gwendolyn Lee, Ioana Popescu, Phanish Puranam, Mari Sako,
Jasjit Singh, Kannan Srikanth, Peter Zemsky, the Management
Science and Innovation reading group at the University Col-
lege London, seminar participants at INSEAD and the Rotter-
dam School of Management, and attendees of the Academy of
Management Conference and the Winter Strategy Conference.
They are grateful for the insightful and constructive comments
of senior editor Nick Argyres and the reviewers. The authors
also appreciate the many people who contributed their time
so generously during their ﬁeldwork. They thank Sicco San-
tema and the Dutch Association for Purchasing Management
(NEVI) for making that possible.
Appendix
We present proofs of all propositions. Upstream sets optimal
effort (e∗) to maximize its net present value of entering the
relationship (UR). If ce and e are twice differentiable,
then the ﬁrst-order condition follows from
UR
e
= 
e

UR −UO− ce
e
+
U
R
e
= 0 (13)
so that

e

UR −UO= ce
e
at e= e∗ (14)
The second-order condition is 2UR/e2 < 0, which
holds for the standard case of increasing marginal costs
2ce/e2 > 0 and decreasing marginal returns 2e/e2
< 0; i.e., more effort increases the continuation probability at
a decreasing rate).
Downstream sets the optimal threshold p∗, expressed as
the proportion of noncontractible value, to maximize its net
present value of entering the relationship (DR). Our results
hold for any wage as long as, for each party, the relationship
is more attractive than the outside option (see (4)). Thus, the
model allows for bargaining over the wage between Upstream
and Downstream, while Downstream selects the threshold.
Provided that the second-order condition holds, then the ﬁrst-
order condition follows from
dDR
dp
= dq¯e
∗
dp
Q+ d
dp

DR −DO+
dD
R
dp
= 0 (15)
so that
dq¯e∗
dp
Q=−d
dp

DR −DO at p= p∗ (16)
Proof of Proposition 1 (e∗/p > 0).
By (14), the threshold (p) affects the marginal beneﬁt of
effort (e) and not the marginal cost. We show below that an
increase in the threshold increases the marginal beneﬁt. As a
result, e∗/p > 0.
From (16) it follows that dq¯e∗/dp and d/dp have the
opposite sign. We can write these terms as
dq¯e∗
dp
= q¯e
∗
e∗
e∗
p
and
d
dp
= 
p
+ 
e∗
e∗
p
 (17)
Because q¯e∗/e∗ > 0, /p < 0, and /e∗ > 0, it fol-
lows that e∗/p > 0 (for otherwise, dq¯e∗/dp and d/dp
would have the same sign).
Proof of Proposition 2 (p∗/QLQ < 0).
Because e∗/p > 0 (see Proposition 1), by (16) we have
dq¯e∗/dp > 0 and d/dp < 0. Thus the left-hand side in
(16) is the marginal beneﬁt of the threshold p, or the incentive
effect; the right-hand side is the marginal cost of the threshold,
or the termination effect.
It follows that an increase in contractible value QL increases
the marginal cost (through DR) but does not affect the marginal
beneﬁt (because noncontractible value Q is constant). There-
fore, p∗/QLQ < 0.
Next we show that p∗/QLQ = −p∗/dO , where dO
is the per-period value of Downstream’s outside option (i.e.,
dO ≡ 1− 
DO). Using DR −DO = QL + q¯e∗Q− w −
dO/1−
, we deﬁne the implicit function F1, based on the
ﬁrst-order condition (16):
F1 ≡
dq¯e∗
dp
Q+ d
dp


QL + q¯e∗Q−w−dO
1−
 = 0
at p= p∗ (18)
Applying the implicit function theorem yields
p∗
QL
∣∣∣∣
Q
=− F1
QL
/F1
p
and
p∗
dO
=− F1
dO
/F1
p
 (19)
Thus, p∗/QLQ = −p∗/dO if F1/QL = −F1/dO ,
which is the case:
F1
QL
= d
dp


1−
 and
F1
dO
=−d
dp


1−
 (20)
Proof of Proposition 3 p∗/QQL < 0).
From (16) it follows that an increase in noncontractible
value Q increases both the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal
cost (through DR) of the threshold. To determine the over-
all effect on the threshold, we deﬁne the implicit function F2,
based on the ﬁrst-order condition (16):
F2 ≡
dq¯e∗
dp
+ d
dp


DR −DO
Q
= 0 at p= p∗ (21)
The second-order condition implies that
F2
p
< 0 at p= p∗ (22)
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Applying the implicit function theorem now yields
p∗
Q
∣∣∣∣
QL
=− F2
Q
/F2
p
 (23)
Since F2/p < 0 (by 22), p
∗/QQL has the same sign as
F2/Q, which has the opposite sign of D
R−DO/Q/
Q (because d/dp < 0 by (16)). Then, since
DR = QL + q¯e
∗Q−w+ 1−
DO
1−

and
DR
Q
= q¯e
∗
1−

we have
DR −DO/Q
Q
= QD
R/Q− DR −DO
Q2
=− QL −w+ 
− 1D
O/1−

Q2
 (24)
Because Downstream’s value of the relationship (DR) if
Upstream has no incentive to perform (e = 0) is less than
Downstream’s outside option (DO), it follows that
QL −w+ 1−
DO
1−
 <D
O
QL −w+ 
− 1DO < 0
(25)
Hence, by (24), DR −DO/Q/Q > 0, and therefore
p∗/QQL < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4 (p∗/QQH > 0).
Given constant total value (QH ), an increase in noncon-
tractible value (Q) is equivalent to a decrease in contractible
value (QL); hence p
∗/QQH and p∗/QLQH have the
opposite sign. Since Q≡QH −QL, it follows from the ﬁrst-
order condition (see (16)) that
dq¯e∗
dp
QH −QL=−
d
dp

DR −DO at p= p∗ (26)
We can now write DR = 1 − q¯e∗QL + q¯e∗QH − w +
1 − 
DO + 
DR, whence an increase in contractible
value (QL) decreases the marginal beneﬁt and increases the
marginal cost (through DR). Therefore, p∗/QLQH < 0 and
p∗/QQH > 0.
Endnotes
1In this paper we are concerned with relational contracts
(which differ from formal contracts in that they are not
enforceable by third parties) as distinct from implicit contracts
(which differ from formal contracts in that their terms are
imprecisely deﬁned or even unspoken).
2We use a generic functional form qe to provide as general
results as possible. The speciﬁc form of qe will affect the
optimal threshold, but it will not affect our propositions, which
have to do with how that threshold responds to changes in
contractibles, noncontractibles, and outside options.
3Following Baker et al. (2002), we acknowledge the impor-
tance of formal contracts but do not model them explicitly
because our main interest is in agreements sustained by the
shadow of the future. Although we discuss several impor-
tant interactions between formal and relational agreements, our
approach does not allow us to cover them all. For more on
such interactions, see Baker et al. (1994) and Bernheim and
Whinston (1998).
4This is equivalent to a guaranteed payment after production.
5If outside opportunities are always less desirable, then it is
never optimal to break the relationship. Although such cases
may exist, they are irrelevant to a model that seeks to char-
acterize the optimal performance threshold for breaking the
relationship.
6According to the well-known Folk Theorem (Fudenberg and
Maskin 1986), repeated-game models often admit many possi-
ble equilibria. We focus on forgiveness in our model because
of its empirical relevance. See the concluding section for
examples.
7Some versions of efﬁciency wage theory—speciﬁcally, the
shirking model (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984)—involve contracts
similar to the one we model here. However, our model is dif-
ferent in at least two key respects. First, efﬁciency wage theory
is more a general equilibrium theory of the labor market than
a theory of bilateral contracting. Second, the efﬁciency wage
literature does not consider the question of the optimal degree
of forgiveness that is the focus of our model.
8We treat the wage as exogenous because our theoretical inter-
est is in the degree of forgiveness. For an analysis of the wage,
see the discussion in §3.4.1.
9The total surplus could be maximized in one of two ways.
One is that a solution is imposed by a social planner. The
other is that the parties autonomously negotiate an improve-
ment on the contract in the main model. However, this would
require a ﬁxed transfer between them that does not affect the
marginal effort incentives. Normally, this would be accom-
plished through the wage. However, in our model, because the
wage is conditional on continuation, which itself is conditional
on effort, it cannot serve this function. Note that for Down-
stream to be better off than under the contract that maximizes
proﬁts, any ﬁxed up-front transfer must be from Upstream to
Downstream. Furthermore, this transfer payment has to cover
the expected duration of the relationship and could therefore
be very large. In other words, there must be one transfer at
the beginning of the relationship, not at the beginning of every
period. We do not observe any up-front payments of any size
from a supplier to a buyer in our ﬁeldwork, possibly because
after such payment, the supplier would worry that the buyer
would not keep its side of the deal.
10The reader might wonder whether Downstream’s promise
to pay the bonus is credible. In Lazear’s (1981) analysis of
a similar contracting relationship, he argues that, in practice,
a ﬁrm will be a party to multiple bilateral contracts that are
essentially identical in their structure (contracts with different
employees, vendors, etc., that are built on the same template).
Promises are therefore credible because any single instance of
reneging would have negative spillovers to all other contracts.
We assume this to be the case.
11For an empirical investigation of the value of outside options,
see Greve et al. (2013).
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12For additional measures of the ability to write complete con-
tracts, see Bidwell (2012).
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